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Abstract
In this paper, we examined 256 cases of financial failure and fraud occuring during the recent Vietnam’s chaotic
years from 2007 to 2013, employing methods of categorical data analysis. Reported results suggest that the
rent-seeking approach, or resource-based orientation, alone does not help explain the outcome of a business
intention while the association between Orientation and Approach is the best-fit predictor. Rampant financial
collapse not only increases the cost of funds but also erodes trust in the economy. Entrepreneurship development
and creativity capacity building are necessary to improve socio-economic conditions and the environment. This
work also introduces intuitive and cognitive factors to predict ex-ante outcome of a financing scheme.
Keywords: financial collapse, rent-seeking, creativity/innovation, economic transition
1. Introduction
Transition economies, like Vietnam, are facing challenging economic issues, due in part to emerging problems
in their insecure and vulnerable financial systems (Vuong 2010; 2012). As Vietnamese became familiar with
concepts of investments, they hope for returns that are good enough for compensating their improved risk
appetite. In addition to willingness for a wide range of assets (Table 1), they were willing to tolerate much
higher risks involved in their transactions and thus pursued different investment vehicles than what had
previously been common.
Table 1. Typical Vietnamese household’s preferable investments
Response

Percentage

Gold

3,052

28.3

Foreign currencies (mostly U.S. Dollars)

1,297

12.0

Bank deposits

3,250

30.2

Land/Housing

2,661

24.7

520

4.8

Stocks

Source: Data were extracted from an online survey by VnExpress.net; the total number of responses is 10,780. (Accessed May 10, 2013).

Unfortunately, most of these approaches were in the so-called underground economy. Thus, casual investors had
intended to act as “sharks” and made money, in fact, became “food” (Vuong, 2011). It appears that many
households and ‘quasi-entrepreneurs’ acted as rent-seekers. They attempted to tap a growing base of resources,
capital and physical, to enter into non-creative activities, as they simply tried to create 'money machines’ (Vuong
& Napier, 2013).
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To gain a clearer sense of whether these assumptions hold, we review 256 cases of financial collapse to learn
about the relationships between failures and frauds, and between collapses and the types of activities or
orientation and business approach that firms pursue.
We question whether such significant relationships could serve to be a qualitative kind of predictor of failure
and fraud, with which society does not have to wait until the collapses take place, when all one could do at best
is collecting financial data, computing ratios and trying to learn about a past event.
2. A Brieft Literature Review
The literature in economics and finance argue a determination to pursue rent-seeking behaviors in the
marketplace can happen in various stages of a business and can take various forms (Tullock, 1967; Krueger
1974; Tollison 1982). Rent-seeking and failures, in particular financial fraud, are both related hypothetically and
empirically, especially in capital markets. Scharfstein and Stein (2000), for example, regarded the combination
of rent-seeking and failure as ‘the dark side of inefficient investments’. That explains why rent-seeking is costly
to economies (e.g., Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny 1993).
In the Vietnamese transition economy, rent-seeking has become rampant, characterized by relationship-based
directed lending, allocation of scarce resources, granted monopolistic/oligopolistic business opportunities and
other special treatments from authorities. Thus, it can hinder both creativity and entrepreneurship from
flourishing (Napier, Dang & Vuong, 2012; Vuong & Napier, 2013). But when rent-seekers miscalculated their
risks and returns, they suffered too, particularly in the Vietnamese M&A market in recent years (Vuong, Napier
& Samson, 2013).
Zmijewski (1984) showed that market participants want methods for predicting financial fraud and failures. But
the existing habits confine practitioners to technical estimations and financial ratios only. Nonetheless, Singleton
and Singleton (2007) suggested that the existing mechanism of financial auditing has not been effective as
hoped, and thus perhaps did not help much in detecting and preventing frauds. Even a famous model for
predicting corporate bankruptcy, like the Altman Z-Score, only serves to be a research model (Moyer, 1977).
Relying on financial ratios does not suffice as a good predictor either. As Ohlson (1980) concluded, technical
details provided by ratios would depend on two facts: a) the event that has already happened; b) a strict
condition of data sufficiency. In addition, Avlonitis, Papastathopoulou and Gounaris (2001) suggested that the
relationships between the degree of innovativeness and performance are significant, but not always positively
correlated.
With regard to examining conditions in Vietnam’s transition turmoil, we follow Pressman (1998), who suggests
that adequate attention should be made to strategic intents of the ventures with respect to both their orientation
(on resources vs. market prospects) and approach taken in trying to fight for the profits they want (rent-seeking
vs. creative performance/innovation). We also build upon previous research attempts in related business issues
dealing with resource-based views toward entrepreneurship, creativity and financial performance, such as
Napier, Dang & Vuong (2012), Vuong, Napier & Samson (2013), Vuong & Napier (2013).
3. Method of Analysis and Data Set
This investigation used categorical data analysis (Agresti, 2002) to examine three hypotheses:
H1. Business managers’ intention on Orientation (tapping resource or pursuing emerging opportunity) and
Approach (rent-seeking vs. creativity) are interdependent.
H2. Structures of frequency distribution by 'Orientation×Approach' of fraud and failure are different.
H3. The association of Orientation and Approach best explains the outcome of a financing scheme.
3.1 Method of Analysis
a) Analysis of association vs. independence using contingency tables:
Contingency tables are comprised of count data in Table 2, appearing as joint frequency, denoted as nij in a
2-way table. The value appears in a cell in the margins of the table is marginal frequency, which is a row/column
total for one category of one variable. For each 2×2 table, row (column) total is noted ni+ (n+j). Observed
marginal probabilities then become pi+=(ni+/n++) for rows, and likewise for column. Total number of observations
is denoted as n++.
Independence between categorical variables of count data is evaluated using odds ratio (θ), with a principle that
if independence holds then true joint probability satisfies:
πij= πi+π+j,
88
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then the use of odds and estimated odds ratio for 2×2 table is relevant:
Odds = π /(1−π),
Odds ratio (θ) = (p11/p12)/(p21/p22)=(n11n12)/(n21n22)
Inference for odds ratio is made through the log odds ratio ln(θ) and the corresponding confidence interval: ln(θ)
±zα/2(s.e.); where (s.e.) is computed standard error for ln(θ):
(s.e.)=[(1/n11) + (1/n12) + (1/n21) + (1/n22)]1/2,
and z ~ iid N(0,1); α (usually 5%) is the power of the test for determining the confidence interval of (1−α). The
data set will be examined under the null hypothesis of independence (H0), using a χ2-distributed likelihood ratio
statistic, with (I−1)(J−1) degrees of freedom:
G2=2ΣIΣJOijln(Oij/Eij)
Also χ2-distributed Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel statistic is reported for evaluating H0, together with Fisher's exact
test (see Agresti, 2002; Vuong, Napier & Tran, 2013).
b) Method of logistic regression:
The logistic regressions take the generic form:
ln(π/(1-π))=β0+β1X1+β2X2 +...+ βkXk+β(k+1)X1X2+β(k+2)X1X3 +...

(1)

Given the data set in Table 3, the most complex specification has only 3 dichotomous predictor variables. The
dichotomous response variable represents types of outcome, taking either 'failure' or 'fraud'.
An exploration into the overall goodness-of-fit is done by testing H0: β1=β2= =0, using the following G2
statistic:
G2=-2ln(L0/L1)=-2[ln(L0)-ln(L1)]
where L0 represents numerical value of the likelihood function obtained from the data under the hypothetical π,
and L1 under the empirically estimated π ̂. This G2 is χ2-distributed, with (k+2) degrees of freedom.
3.2 Data
Each data point is classified into categories: type: fraud/failure; approach: rent-seeking/creativity; orientation:
resources/market prospects. These are selected to reflect nature of a financial collapse during Vietnam's
2007-2013 transition turmoil.
Next, to understand the relationships between failure, fraud and organizational orientation (e.g, tapping out
resources or seeking prospective markets), we prepared a structured data set as a frequency distribution (Table
2).
Table 2. Structured data on outcome
Orientation
Resource
Failure
Fraud

Prospect

Total

Rent-seeking

8

29

37

Creativity

0

10

10

181

19

200

5

4

9

194

62

256

Rent-seeking
Creativity

Total

Prior to 2007, the incidents of financial collapse were small in scale, simple business models, and almost solely
within the informal economic sector. For instance, ‘Hui’ – an informal and primitive form of banking operation was typical and popular since late 1980s to 2000s. Individual members of a ‘Hui’ group commit to contribute a
fix amount of money every term, often one week or one month. Each term, one member takes the sum of the
contributed money to use in his or her business. Such rotation allows every individual to get his/her accumulated
saving at once, instead of waiting for weeks and months. ‘Hui’ was interesting because it began as an innocent
credit group or cooperatives but most ended as a fraud, not a business failure. When a ‘Hui’ group expanded,
one member would be promoted to chair. The rotation kept continuing but the member, who is able to take the
sum, would sell his/her right to the chair, very often, with a premium. The chair then would invested the sum
him/herself or lend the money to other. In other words, the chair ran a banking business. If debtors were not able
89
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to repay, then the chair was in trouble. He/she tried to cover such failure by creating a sort of Ponzi scheme.
Ultimately, some groups went from a loss of millions to tens of millions of U.S. dollar. Even so, the longevity of
some ‘Hui’ groups was significant: a 40-member ‘Hui’ group in Ho Chi Minh City reportedly lasted for 26 years,
from 1980 to 2006.
The notion of stock markets, of course, was quite new for the Vietnamese economy as it moved away from a
planned focus. With little direct involvement or knowledge of how a stock market operated, then, many
Vietnamese assumed that whatever they invested would go “up” in value, and as a result, they did not conceive
or understand the concept of downside risk. The surge of the Vietnamese stock markets in 2006-2007 reflected
that expectation and, as the economy boomed, people became overly confident of a bright future of the
transition economy. They had reason to believe in such a positive trend as the Vietnam-Index increased by more
than 200% from March 2006 to March 2007, reaching its peak of 1,171 on March 12, 2007. Watching such a
trend led many in Vietnam to believe that the exchange was a 'money machine.'
But soon, the public noticed that financial frauds were increasingly reported by the local media. The frauds also
became larger, more complicated, and more often were related to formal credit system. For example, in some
banks, the staff produced fake documents and cheated surveillance systems to embezzle their bank’s money
while convincing themselves that handsome profits would bring them large gains shortly and that they would
safely return their “borrowed funds” to the bank. Others individuals advertised themselves as having important
and strong relationships that allowed for purchasing stocks at prices far below market prices. Members of the
public sometimes bought the privileges of being able to purchase stocks, and often did buy stock, but alas, never
received it. Such examples of fraud began and grew in earnest as the turmoil escalated.
The period 2007-2013 is critical for Vietnam. Right after the stock market reached its peak, the emerging
economy entered a turbulent period. Stock prices tumbled; the VN-Index plummeted to 287 in December 2008.
Inflation roared to 23% in 2008. Monetary policy tightened the market rate for credit to as much as 25%. In
addition to financial fraud, bankruptcies and business closures were prominent in the news. From early 2011 to
the end of 2012, over 100,000 (mostly private) enterprises declared insolvency or quietly closed operations,
accounting for between 15-25% of the enterprise population (Vuong and Napier, 2013).
Well-established incorporations, in both state and private sectors, were also facing severe problems, often
financial collapse. Losses increased to tens and hundreds of millions, even billions of U.S. dollars. For example,
Vietnam’s major coffee exporter, Thai Hoa Co., was technically bankrupt with a debt of about $60 million,
while the state-owned shipbuilder Vinashin reportedly possessed a debt burden of approximately $4 billion.
Even financial tycoons, like Nguyen Duc Kien and Huynh Thi Huyen Nhu, were accused of financial
wrongdoings that resulted in their creditors’ losses of $370 million and $250 million, respectively, and the cases
are under investigation. Increasing number of bankers and financiers has been arrested in recent years, also
suggests more complicated financial frauds.
Next, to understand the relationships between failure, fraud and organizational orientation (e.g, tapping out
resources or seeking prospective markets), we prepared a structured data set as a frequency distribution, given in
table 3.
Intuitively, the frequency distributions shown in Table 3 tell us that the 'Rent-seeking × Resource' pair, in the
'Fraud' partial table, appears to be most 'influential' followed by 'Rent-seeking × Prospect' ('Failure' partial table).
Additionally, it does not seem that 'Creativity' has a strong influence on explaining structure of the table. But
more meaningful insights follow the empirical results provided in the next section.
4. Emprical Results
Results reported in this section are evaluated using SAS® Software. Firstly, test for independence between
Orientation and Approach in the given data structure employs both χ2-distributed Pearson-statistic (X2) and G2
with df=1, and Fisher's exact test for right-sided probability, with results reported in Table 3.
Table 3. Statistical independence check for data in table 2
X2; G2
N=256 (No-split)
N=209 (Frauds-only)

256; 135 (df=1)
209; 74 (df=1)

p-Value
<.0001
<.0001

90

Fisher's (right-sided prob)

Rejected

-16

Rejected

4.2×10
5.7×10

Independence

-29
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For both the sample, and sub-sample for fraud cases only, 'Orientation' and 'Approach' are statistically dependent.
That means the business's intention on orientation tends to define their approach (either seeking economic rents
or making innovation efforts), and vice versa.
In addition, the homogeneous association between Fraud and Failure structures of frequency distribution by
'Orientation×Approach' is meaningful. This examination uses control variate of 'type', showing a
Cochran‐Mantel‐Haenszel statistic value of 11.2 (df=1), then p-Value=0.0008. Thus, the null hypothesis H0 for
statistical independence is decisively rejected. So, in general, one could not confirm the major difference
between the structured relationships in two categorical data tables.
Subsequently, logistic regressions results are provided. Test statistic values (G2 and p-Value in table 4) reject the
H0 for all equations from 2 to 4.
ln(π/(1-π))=β0+β1X1 +β2X2

(2)

ln(π/(1-π))=β0+β2X2

(3)

ln(π/(1-π))=β0+β3X1X2

(4)

where X1,X2 are predictor variables “Rent-seeker” and “Resource Orientation”, respectively. The reference
categories for these models are Rentseek='Rent0', and Resource='Res0', in this order.
Table 4. Logistic regression and MLE analysis
Coefficients

Estimates (s.e.)

G2(p-Value for H0)

-2ln(L)

Eq.(2)

β2(*)

3.6056(0.4594)

96.0 (<0.0001)

148

Eq.(3)

β0(**); β2(*)

‐0.5281 (0.2629)

95.7 (<0.0001)

149

86.8(<0.0001)

157

3.6743 (0.4466)
Eq.(4)

β3(*)

3.4503(0.4380)

2

Notes: The critical value for a χ -distributed random variable (df=1, proba=0.01) is 6.6349. βi (*), (**) are statistically significant at 1 and 5%
levels, respectively. (s.e.): Computed standard errors for making appropriate statistical inference.

Table 4 provides estimates and relevant statistics for only significant coefficients, which essentially confirm the
hypothetical relationships specified in Eqs. (2-4).
Reported statistics show that Eq. (4) best fits our data, with -2ln(L) value being 157. Given our consideration of
both "approach" and "orientation", the Eq. (4) specification enables us to see influence of both through a
significant estimate of β3, at any conventional level.
From the results of Table 4, it is evident that a determination of 'Approach=Rent-seeking' alones does not help
explain the outcome, with no β0 being reported significant in any estimations. That means the fact that a venture
chooses to pursue rent-seeking - which is costly to economies (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer
& Vishny, 1993) - does not suffice to turn it into a financial scam. But 'Orientation=Resources' does, with β2
being reported significant at any conventional levels. In these estimations, β2 are quite large in magnitude too,
showing their large influence on explaining type of outcome for the empirical data.
Last, there is an intriguing result coming from the best fit estimation, i.e. Eq.(4). The fact that β3 is highly
significant, and with large magnitude has some important meaning, both theoretically and empirically. It
re-confirms the previously reported result of association between orientation of resources and approach of
rent-seeking to the extent that their joint effect is quite significant in determining the specific value of outcome
Frauds. It is also reasonable to see the separate influence of resources orientation as the single most important
and dominating in the cases of Vietnamese financial collapses. However, the genuine frauds have also been
influenced by both factors of rent-seeking approach and resource-based orientations before or during the
implementing of the business plan.
5. Conclusions
Many people are interested in predicting financial collapse, both failures and fraud, and face challenges of
availability of data, professional knowledge, and the most important, the performance of an existing financing
scheme (e.g., Zmijewski, 1984; Singleton & Singleton, 2007; Moyer, 1977; Ohlson, 1980). This investigation
suggests intuitive and cognitive indications – considering the association of orientation and approach – that
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could help predict ex-ante outcome.
The interdependence of orientation and approach of a business’s intention explains increasing numbers of
financial collapses in economic turmoil. The existence of innovation does not ensure a successful business but
improves creditors/investors’ confidence in the entrepreneurial endeavors of fundraisers. Indeed, a neglect of
creative performance and reliance on capital and physical resources may lead a business to acute problems
caused by the law of diminishing returns (Vuong & Napier, 2013).
Moreover, lack of innovation, such as the introduction of new products and employment of new technology,
prevents business from approaching funding opportunities. In a relationship-based economy, like Vietnam, an
entrepreneur has to stand out of the crowd if he wants to attract the society’s attention (Vuong & Tran, 2009).
In addition, it is noteworthy that although traditions of managements often view a business organization as a
machine of “information processing”, Einstein remins us “information is not knowledge.” Therefore, while lots
of Vietnamese amateur and professional business people are scrambling for privileded or inside information –
considered as a type of rent seeking – they trap themselves. Nonaka (1991) affirms that the most single lasting
competitive advantage is knowledge, especially “in an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty.” In light
of this, if a business wants to survive and pursue success then its “sole business” must be “continuous
innovation”.
The complication of modern economies and the revolution of information technology sometimes confuses
people who see innovative traits that may (or may not) be in reality financial frauds. Several confusing examples
have appeared in the last few years. When the producer of Thanh Huong Perfume Co. raised funds from
relatives, friends, and business-partners in late 1980s, most Vietnamese were unfamiliar with the product. Thus,
many believed that the producer possessed some extraordinary technology or knowhow that could generate
handsome profits. In 2008, Sacombank’s Real Estate Company (Sacomreal) introduced a truly innovative
financial product to the infant corporate bond market of Vietnam when it issued corporate bonds that provide
bondholders with right to purchase properties developed by the company (Vuong & Tran 2011). Commercially,
that innovative product sold really well, as the instrument met the market need. Naturally, the bond offerings
contributed to make Sacomreal one of the most prominent property developers, whose shares have been listed
on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange. And just recently several IT firms introduced e-commerce to new computer
users in their attempts at persuading them to invest in their online-store websites. The perfume producer, the real
estate bond market financier, and the IT developers did believe that they were creating some true value.
But they hyped their stories – from the capacity for perfume production, to the market demand for apartments
and offices, to the selling power of fancy online stores. Then, when each of these fundraisers faced problems,
they in essence tried to set up Ponzi schemes to maintain their performance and ultimately their business failures
turned out to be financial frauds. Here, Pressman (1998) is right, again.
The investors were so confident of their assessment of market prospects, the property bubble, and the
ecommerce trend that they did not expect or see more deeply into the possibility of fraud. Psychology and the
resulting decisions–by greed and scarce business opportunities–may also induce creditors/investors to put their
money in risky nests. It is not because of asymmetric information but because of the lack of cost-benefit
consideration and careful multi-layer filtering of information (e.g., Vuong & Napier, 2012) that investors fall
prey to the dangers lurking in conditions of turmoil. Despite an appreciation of the credit crunch and economic
stagflation, many investors still scramble to withdraw their savings, gather cash from family members and
friends, and even to mortgage their houses to lend money and then hope for pretty profits. They innocently
ignore the fact that they lent money at sky-high interest rates and that none was able to repay a loan at such rate
plus a premium of the usury lenders.
Financial cheaters, on the other hand, well understand the critical effect of psychology. All of their resources,
including creativity capability, are employed to build and leverage their close relations to high-ranking
bureaucrats, luxury manage their reputations and impressions, and convey the image of successful
businesspeople. In reality, some appear to be seeking personal, and perhaps fraudulent, gain.
Last but not least, considering the association of orientation and approach provides potential method of early
prediction of the outcomes of a financing scheme. Likewise, it appears that over-tapping available resources and
strictly seeking profits to the detriment of investing within the firm in more innovative directions may likely
result in collapse. An economic setting of an easing monetary policy and worsening business prospect – for
instance, lowering interest rate in association with increasing unemployment – is comfortable environment for
financial frauds blossom. In light of this, the economy has to pay for increasing cost of funds, and more
important, society’s trust is being eroded. Fortunately, entrepreneurship development - to shift business
92
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orientation to economic prospect – and innovation capacity building – to shift business approach to creativity –
are possible to pave a pathway out of deadlock situation of this kind.
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